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Abstract
This paper is based on the authors’ study to assess the current state of anti-corruption movement
in Indonesia. The main purpose of this study is to explore the potential of social media to be used
as an effective tool in combating corruption in public sector. To achieve its objectives this study
applies multiple behavioral perspectives in assessing the corruption problem in the Indonesian
public sector. This study is of qualitative exploratory nature in which the authors utilized a mixed
methods approach comprising of a systematic literature review, archival and data analysis, and
case studies on corruption in the Indonesian public sector to assess the potential of social media
to be used as an anti-corruption measure. This study also uses the Social Network Analysis
(SNA) to illustrate the potential of social media as a means for citizens to participate in an anticorruption movement in Indonesia. Overall, this study demonstrates that the growth and
development of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in Indonesia has had a
profound effect on how people interact with each other by, among other things, using social
media platforms. Such interaction includes discussions and dissemination of news and
information related to corruption. As the conventional punishment oriented approaches have not
had a lot of success in mitigating the corruption problem in Indonesia, engaging citizens to
actively participate in the anti-corruption movement may increase the chance of success in
eradicating corruption in the future.
JEL Classification: Z18, M48.
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Introduction
As a worldwide problem, the history of corruption is believed to be as old as human history
itself, and it is growing to be more pervasive and significant by the day (Kayrak, 2008; Shleifer
and Vishny, 1993). Dye (1998) defined corruption as the "abuse of public power for personal
gain or for the benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance." The public is now aware of the
fact that poor governance will eventually lead to corruption and thus many have advocated for
the promotion of good governance as a key in ensuring the sustainability of economic growth
and competitiveness (Clark, 2017, p. 3). Combating corruption has now become a global
movement (Shah, 2007, p. 234) and countries are devoting substantial resources to ensure that
their future generations will not inherit the problem. However, a major challenge in eradicating
corruption is the perception that it is a “high reward, low risk” (Quah, 2017) action and thus
many public officials are willing to engage in corrupt acts.
The complexity of corruption is constituted by its multi-dimensional nature which demands a
multi-perspective view in understanding and solving it (Di Pietra and Melis, 2016, p. 689).
Evidence suggests that the elusive nature of corruption has made it difficult for many countries
to properly address the problem. Many have been focusing on areas such as weak law
enforcement, inadequate legal framework, and lack of proper mechanisms for transparency and
accountability when addressing corruption. In reality, various behavioral issues may become the
root causes of corruption which must be addressed properly. Ignoring these issues may lead to
failures in achieving the objectives of corruption eradication strategies.
Today, a large portion of people’s interaction occurs within the realm of cyberspace which
highlights the significance of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in
shaping human behavior. Social media has been playing a significant role in modern human
interaction. In Indonesia, for example, information on various issues including those related to
corruption are frequently shared and discussed among social media users on a daily basis.
This paper seeks to explore the potential of social media in shaping people's attitude toward
corruption, particularly in Indonesia4. This paper also highlights the dimensions of social media
as well as how to optimize them in supporting the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia. The
next section of this paper discusses how the ICTs, in particular, the internet and social media can
influence the perception of costs and benefits of corruption and how anti-corruption movement
in Indonesia is transforming in the digital age as well as the role of social media in its
transformation. By using a sample case study on a high profile corruption case in Indonesia, this
section illustrates the potential roles of social media as an anticorruption instrument. In this
section, the Social Network Analysis (SNA) is used to identify multiple roles of Twitter users in
disseminating information about corruption. Next, this paper discusses future directions to
enhance the effectiveness of social media as an anti-corruption instrument in Indonesia. In the
final section, a conclusion is drawn regarding the roles of social media in supporting the anticorruption movement in Indonesia.
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The “Why” Question of Corruption
Based on the Corruption Eradication Commission’s (KPK) statistics from the total of 739
investigated corruption suspects in the period of 2004 – 2017 approximately 25% were private
sector professionals and around 24% were higher echelon (I, II and III) public officials which
represent the two largest corruption offender groups in Indonesia. The third largest group in the
commission’s database consists of members of central and regional parliaments (19%). Below
figure depicts the distribution (in percentage) of corruption offenders across different
professional backgrounds.
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Figure 1: Corruption Offenders Investigated by the Corruption Eradication Commission
(2004 – 2017, Data per 31 December 2017)
Source: Modified from Corruption Eradication Commission (2018)
Despite numerous prosecutions of public officials corruption in Indonesia seems to always able
to regenerate over time. To put an end to this regeneration, the causal factors behind the
pervasive corruption in Indonesia needs to be clearly identified beforehand. One of the most
commonly used frameworks in explaining why people engage in fraud such as corruption is the
so-called fraud triangle based on the work of criminologist Donald Ray Cressey who postulated
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that in order for fraud (i.e., trust violation) to occur the elements of motivation, opportunity and
rationalization must be present (Cressey, 1950).
Opportunity

FRAUD
TRIANGLE

Rationalization

Motivation

Figure 2 Fraud Triangle
Source: Modified from Cressey (1950)
With regard to the motivation to commit fraud Cressey (1950, p. 97) was of the opinion that nonshareable problems (e.g., financial problems) may motivate an otherwise honest person to
commit fraud. With this motivation when an opportunity to commit fraud presents itself, it will
likely be considered by the person as a solution to his problems (Cressey, 1950, pp. 123–124).
For example, Dorminey et al. (2012, p. 558) stated that control weakness is often associated with
a perceived opportunity to commit fraud as the potential offender may believe that his chance of
getting caught is slim. Rationalization element completes the triangle by providing means for
fraud offenders to avoid guilt or self-condemnation. As argued by Ramamoorti (2008, p. 525):
Specifically, trust violators and fraud perpetrators must be able to justify their actions to
themselves and others as a psychological coping mechanism to deal with the inevitable "cognitive
dissonance" (that is, a lack of congruence between their own perception of being honest and the
deceptive nature of their action or behavior). This explanation led to the inclusion of
"rationalization" as one of the elements in the conceptual framework provided by the "Fraud
Triangle"…

Cressey (1950, p. 201) believed that rationalizations are not merely ex-post facto justifications
for conduct which have already been enacted but are pertinent and real reasons which the person
has for acting. In other words, fraud offenders may prepare their rationalizations before they
actually commit their fraudulent acts. Kenyon and Tilton (2006, pp. 135–136) were of the
opinion that rationalization can take various form such as: “it’s just temporary”, “management
doesn’t care”, “management participates in, expects and rewards this kind of behavior”, “no one
is hurt and the company is helped” and “I deserve this” .
Regardless of its popularity among in particular anti-fraud scholar, the fraud triangle is often
unable to explain why people commit or avoid corrupt acts. Some scholars argue that it is so
because the fraud triangle is essentially a theory for understanding fraud but not necessarily fraud
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causation5. For example, Lokanan (2015, p. 2), was of the opinion that the fraud triangle is an
inadequate instrument for detecting fraud as it lacks the "objective criteria required to adequately
address every occurrence of fraud." In reality, there have been more than a few cases of people
who were continuously exposed to the three elements of the triangle but were able to maintain
their integrity and accountability throughout their professional careers. For example, during the
period of 1968 – 1971 Police General Hoegoeng Iman Santoso who served as the Chief of the
Indonesian National Police was known for his unquestionable integrity and accountability in
fulfilling his duty. Being an “anomaly” in the then corrupt regime Hoegoeng’s stance against
corruption had made him in conflicts with many military and political elites of the time and
eventually led to his dismissal (Muradi, 2014).
Prabowo (2014) stated that corruption is essentially an outcome of a decision making process in
which a potential offender takes a number of variables into consideration for deciding the best
solution for his perceived problem. Generally, referring to the rational choice theory crime
offenders are always seeking ways to perpetrate their offences which maximize their benefits and
at the same time minimize their sacrifices. As explained by Satz and Ferejohn (1994, p. 71):
The theory of rational choice plays a central role in the social sciences. The received view among
philosophers who study rational-choice theory (both proponents and critics) holds that the theory is
psychological and individualistic. Rational-choice theory is taken to be a psychological theory in that it
explains a person's actions in terms of his mental states. A rational choice or action is one in which the
agent takes the best available action given her preferences and beliefs. The theory is also taken to be an
individualistic theory in that it applies directly only to individuals (that is, only individuals have
preferences).

Prabowo (2014) argued that when exposed to the fraud triangle elements before making his final
decision a potential corruption offender will generally perform an assessment on the net benefits
of committing or not committing a corrupt act. In the case of rampaging corruption in Indonesia
Prabowo (2014) was of the opinion that it is mainly caused by public officials perceiving that the
net benefits (perceived benefits deducted by perceived costs) of engaging in corrupt acts
outweigh those of not doing so. For every perceived element, a potential offender will determine
its weigh by assigning a subjective value that in practice may not be mathematically quantifiable.
Regardless of their law breaking activities, corrupt public officials are basically seeking for the
so-called "good life," at least in the short run, which is often associated with happiness, wealth
and prosperity. The concept of “good life” has been extensively studied by numerous scholars
(King et al., 2012, p. 35). Rawls in his works discussed multiple philosophical dimensions of the
good life (Freeman, 2007; Habermas, 2010; Rawls, 2009; Rawls and Cohen, 2010). Wolf (1997,
p. 219) believed meaningfulness constitutes a major element of the good life. King et al. (2012,
p. 37) viewed happiness as a major indicator of the good life. Jenkins and Curtis (2005) found
that good health is paramount in achieving the good life. In his work, Political Liberalism, Rawls
argued that in a modern society there should not be a consensus of what constitutes a good life,
but instead, we must acknowledge and respect the existence and plurality of multiple
contradicting doctrines (Davion and Wolf, 2000; Rawls, 2005). This paper is not in any way an
attempt to propose a new doctrine of the good life. In reality, an individual’s decision making
5
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process to achieve a better life is a highly complex process which is very difficult for scientists to
fully understand, much less to express it in a mathematical formula. Nonetheless, for the sake of
providing a simple illustration of the weighing process discussed above, we will assume that it is
quantifiable despite being subjectively so. Below figure illustrates a simple example of such an
assessment.
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3
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Perceived costs of not accepting a bribe
1
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(10)
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Figure 3. A simple illustration of subjective cost-benefit assessment to accept or to reject a
bribe
Source: Modified from Prabowo (2014)
Figure 3 illustrates a simple example of how a potential corrupt offender subjectively measures
his perceived net benefits from accepting a bribe. Assuming that he relies only on the given
perceived cost – benefit elements, the final decision would be to accept bribe simply because the
option has higher perceived net benefits compared to the alternative. It is worthy of note that in
reality there are a wide variety of factors that may influence a potential offender's subjective
assessment of the value of each cost – benefit element. For example, a weak anti-corruption
agency and a corrupt prison system in a country will diminish the subjective value of the "risk of
detection and prosecution" element. Conversely, a strong and independent anti-corruption
agency together with a good prison system will increase it. In practice, there are a variety of
measures which can be employed to influence potential offenders' perception of the costs and
benefits of engaging in corrupt acts. These include measures for gradually changing societal and
organizational culture. Prabowo et al. (2017) proposed the so-called “de-normalization” of
corruption as an important step in changing organizational culture in public institutions to
become more intolerant to corruption. Furthermore, to ensure the success of the de-normalization
process Prabowo et al. (2018) proposed that organizational unlearning needs to be exercised by
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public institutions to remove corruption related knowledge so that the new knowledge of
integrity and accountability can be accepted by public officials.
Based on the above cost-benefit model, generally preventing corruption from occurring can be
done by making it an irrational choice of action. In other words, a potential offender will refrain
himself from committing a corrupt act if he perceives the net benefits thereof to be lower than
those of not committing the act. Making corruption an irrational choice of action can be
achieved by:


Increasing the net benefits of not committing corruption (e.g., increasing the perceived
value of good reputation)
 Increasing the perceived costs of committing corruption (e.g., increasing the likelihood of
detection and prosecution)
 Decreasing the perceived benefits of committing corruption (e.g., decreasing the
perceived value of blind loyalty to superiors)
 Decreasing the perceived costs of not committing corruption (e.g., increasing protection
for staffs who do not engage in corrupt acts)
In addition to increasing the likelihood of detection and prosecution another example of ways to
increase potential offenders’ perceived costs of engaging in corrupt acts is increasing the
likelihood of naming and shaming in particular by the public. As will be discussed in the
following sections in this paper naming and shaming is among the roles social media can take in
combatting corruption in a country. As described by Prabowo and Cooper (2016), corruption is
so culturally entrenched in Indonesia that many people accept it as a norm. Furthermore,
Prabowo et al. (2017, p. 552) argued that:
The normalized corruption in Indonesia is a legacy of the New Order regime that shaped societal,
organizational and individual schemata in Indonesia. The patrimonial style of leadership in
particular within the regional governments resulted in increasing rent seeking activities within the
decentralized system. The leadership style is also believed to have been supporting the
normalization of corruption within the public sector since the New Order era.

This condition requires the use of multiple approaches to diminish the threats of corruption by all
means possible with people’s support (Prabowo et al., 2017, p. 552). This is to say that
everybody has their share of roles in combating corruption in the country. The authors believe
that social media can be a powerful means for people to participate more actively in the anticorruption movement. Through interactions with each other social media users can raise their
awareness on various issues pertaining to corruption. In the long run, with their increasing
awareness, they will gradually change their attitude toward corruption and become intolerant to
it.

The Rising Power of Social Media and the Anti-Corruption Movement in the Digital Age
Since its inception in 1983 the internet has been playing a significant role in Indonesia as a vital
communication instrument and is continuously growing in popularity (Hui, 2010, p. 171).
According to a survey by the Indonesian Internet Service Providers Association (APJII), in 2016,
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51.8% of the nation’s population (approximately 256.2 million) were internet users (Indonesian
Internet Service Providers Association, 2016, p. 6). In terms of the internet market, according to
a study by Google and Temasek (2016, p. 7), by 2020 Indonesia could become the fastest
growing nation in the world.
The use of mobile devices to access the internet has been growing rapidly in Indonesia over the
past few years and is now one of the most common ways information is disseminated in the
society. For example, based on APJII’s survey 47.6% of users use a mobile phone to access the
internet (Indonesian Internet Service Providers Association, 2016, p. 16). According to
comScore’s 2016 survey, mobile devices are currently dominating online activities worldwide,
and Indonesia is not an exception. In fact, the survey also revealed that Indonesian internet users
spend 91% of their online time on their mobile devices (comScore, 2017, p. 4).
In terms of online activities, according to APJII’s (2016, p. 22) survey, 97.4% of internet users in
the country are social media users. Other popular contents accessed by users include
entertainment (96.8%), news (96.4%), education (93.8%), commercial (93.1%), and public
service (91.6%) (Indonesian Internet Service Providers Association, 2016, p. 22). With regard to
social media, Indonesia is considered one of the largest Facebook users as well as the most
Twitter addicted nation in the world (Sidner, 2010). Another survey by comScore (2010) on the
top world markets by Twitter penetration put Indonesia on the top of the list with 20.8 %
penetration (in June 2010).
The advancement of ICTs has been transforming how information is disseminated to and
responded by the society. Evidence suggests that ICTs have been playing an essential role in
fighting corruption by empowering citizens, upholding good governance, and promoting
transparency(Kanyam et al., 2017, p. 1). Gazali (2014, p. 426) inferred that Indonesia is a
fascinating “live laboratory” for studying how ICTs especially the internet plays a crucial role in
the democratization process. For example, the internet was believed to have facilitated people’s
movement to bring down the corrupt New Order regime in May 1998 (Gazali, 2014, p. 426).

Social Media vs. Corruption: A Case Study of Indonesia
On 20 June 2017 the then Governor of Bengkulu Province was arrested by the Corruption
Eradication Commission (KPK) in a sting operation, and soon after, the public expressed their
reactions on various social media platforms. According to a Deputy Chairman of KPK,
Alexander Marwata, the governor allegedly rigged the tender for two road development projects
in Rejang Lebong Regency Bengkulu in exchange for Rp 1 billion (US$ 75,000) in bribes (The
Jakarta Post, 2017). The authors analyzed a dataset of 300 tweets and retweets on 20 and 21 June
2017 obtained through the NCapture tool in NVivo 11 (using “OTT KPK Bengkulu” or “KPK’s
sting operation in Bengkulu" as keywords) to identify the most highlighted issues in the case.
The dataset was analyzed using, among other things, the word frequency query tool in NVivo 11
software with several irrelevant words (e.g., stop words) being excluded from the analysis.
Below figure is a “word cloud” representation of the query results.
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Figure 4. “Word cloud” representation of the
25 most frequently used words in Twitter
responses to the arrest of the Governor of
Bengkulu Province
Source: Authors’ analysis using NVivo 11
As depicted by Figure 4 the word “istri” or “wife” is the most frequently used word in the sample
tweets and retweets. According to the KPK, the governor’s wife allegedly served as the
“middleman” who accepted the bribes for the road development projects (The Jakarta Post,
2017). Family members’ involvement in high profile corruption cases have been identified by
many anti-corruption scholars as a major factor which causes corruption to become so
entrenched in Indonesia. Masaaki (2004, p. 23) assessed that the implementation of the
decentralization system in Indonesia has created opportunities for some local leaders to behave
like “small kings” and use their positions for personal or family benefits.
The effectiveness of social media in supporting anti-corruption movement is largely depending
on the effectiveness of information distribution to the society. For this, there needs to the socalled “information gatekeepers” with considerable control over information diffusion (Riddell et
al., 2017, p. 282). Based on a network analysis using NVivo 11 a graphical representation of the
network of interactions in Twitter (i.e., tweets, retweets and mentions)6Which also represents
information diffusion with regard to the Bengkulu Governor's alleged corruption case is as
follows.

6

This study uses tweets, retweets and mentions to focus on the network of interactions in Twitter for a given
corruption related issue.
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Figure 5. Network of interactions in Twitter (20 and 21 June 2017) related to the alleged
corruption case involving the former Governor of Bengkulu
Source: Authors’ analysis using NVivo 11
In the above figure, the vertices (i.e., the dots) represent Twitter usernames who make tweets,
retweets and mentions on a given topic (QSR International, 2018a). User interactions (retweets
and mentions) in the network are depicted by edges (lines) (QSR International, 2018a).
With regard to the above graphical representation of Twitter network using Social Network
Analysis (SNA), further examination can be performed to identify the most important vertices to
identify the most influential people in the network. Three important questions regarding the
“central figures” from the above Twitter network are (QSR International, 2018b):




How fast can this person reach everyone in the network?
Which person is most likely to have the most information flowing through them?
How many people can this person reach directly?

The three questions can be answered using centrality measures (i.e., vertex metrics) such as
“closeness centrality," “betweenness centrality," and “degree centrality” respectively.
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Closeness centrality was defined by Freeman (1979) as the sum of distances of one node from all
other nodes in a network graph. It depicts how fast information can move to other points from a
given starting point (QSR International, 2017). In other words, it indicates people with the
easiest and quickest access to information in a given network (QSR International, 2017).
Generally, information coming from a person with the most central position (i.e., with the
highest closeness centrality score) can be disseminated throughout the network more time
efficiently (Bavelas, 1948). Based on authors’ analysis there are twenty six usernames some of
which are personal accounts with the closeness centrality of 1, the highest score in the dataset.
These personal accounts also represent citizens’ role in the rapid distribution of information
about corruption within a social network. The KPK’s Twitter account is only ranked 46th with
the score of 0.125. Again, the authors believe that KPK’s lower score is primarily attributed to
their limited activities on Twitter to maintain their independence7.
In a social network a person can be considered as a central figure if he is strategically located on
the communication paths connecting pairs of others and thus is able to influence his network
(e.g., by withholding or distorting the flow of information) (Bavelas, 1948; Freeman, 1979;
Shaw, 1954). In the science of Social Network Analysis (SNA) this role is represented by a
measure known as “betweenness centrality." Freeman (1979, p. 221) explained that this type of
centrality measure is calculated based on the numeration of incidents where a point “falls
between pairs of other points on the shortest geodesic paths connecting them." In a social
network like Twitter, users with high betweenness centrality scores essentially “provide the
shortest paths between other users within the network” (Riddell et al., 2017, p. 282).
From the authors’ analysis (from a total of 193 Twitter accounts) using NVivo 11, the account
@Ronin1948, has the betweenness centrality score of 4,098 which is the highest in the dataset.
On the other hand, the official account of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK),
@KPK_RI, only scores 12 and is ranked ninth. This illustrates a role that Twitter users can play
in the anti-corruption movement by becoming active disseminators of information on corruption.
However, the authors also believe that the KPK’s lower rank may have been attributed to the fact
that the agency has always been very careful when making statements regarding its corruption
investigations and thus it often keeps its Twitter activities to a minimum. With this limitation, the
commission needs citizens’ support in disseminating news and information about anti-corruption
activities to promote public awareness and to stimulate constructive discussions.
Degree centrality represents the number of ties incident on a node (Borgatti, 2005, p. 62) which,
in a network like Twitter, translates into “popularity” (in-degree) and “influence” (out-degree)
(Gruzd and Haythornthwaite, 2013, p. 6). In Twitter in-degree centrality can be associated with
the number of times a user is mentioned or replied to (Gruzd and Haythornthwaite, 2013, p. 6).
On the other hand, the number of times a user mentions or replies to others represents out-degree
centrality (Gruzd and Haythornthwaite, 2013, p. 6). Based on authors’ analysis, the account
7

Regardless of its limited resources the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has been known for its
uncompromised independence in investigating even corruption cases involving high ranking government officials
(Prabowo, 2014). At the time of writing in addition to being an academic at the Islamic University of Indonesia, the
first author also serves as a managing editor at the KPK's Jurnal Integritas (Journal of Integrity). The first author has
also been involved in a number of anti-corruption activities and events organized by the commission.
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@Ronin1948 has the highest degree centrality of 48 which represents the highest popularity and
influence in the network whereas the Corruption Eradication Commission’s (KPK) official
account, @KPK_RI, is only ranked 19th with the score of 2.
A central issue in the discussions on the roles of the internet and social media in anti-corruption
movement is the effect of rapid information dissemination to public awareness on corruption
(DiRienzo et al., 2007). Jha and Sarangi (2017) were of the opinion that the large number of
social media users also represents the large number of audience who may share views,
experiences, and opinions related to corruption. Therefore, social media may serve as a low cost
means for disseminating information to a larger audience to trigger a public reaction against
corrupt acts (Jha and Sarangi, 2017). The dissemination of information on corruption over social
media platforms will increase citizens’ awareness on the true extent of corruption in the country.
Upon realizing the true damages from corrupt acts (e.g., substandard public facilities) and how
they may have affected their wellbeing citizens will be motivated to voice their concerns and to
condemn the offenders.
An example of the success of social media movement in supporting anti-corruption is that of the
alleged criminalization of the then KPK Deputy Commissioners Bibit Samad Riyanto and
Muhammad Chandra Hamzah (Beyerle, 2014; Molaei, 2015). The two were (wrongfully)
arrested on 29 October 2009 by the police on suspicion of power abuse and bribery (The Jakarta
Globe, 2009a, 2009b). Soon after the arrest anti-corruption supporters reacted by voicing their
protests through social media. For example, the “1,000,000 facebookers supporting Chandra
Hamzah and Bibit Samad Riyanto” movement (Gerakan 1,000,000 Facebookers Dukung
Chandra Hamzah dan Bibit Samad Riyanto) was started by an anti-corruption activist, Usman
Yasin, on the same day (Gazali, 2014, p. 429; Molaei, 2015, p. 99). Shortly after, chain messages
were accumulating in social media and rallies were taking place across a number of areas
including campuses and the KPK’s office (Gazali, 2014, p. 429). The online movement also
attracted a lot of attention from various media in the country and garnered over a million online
supports just within a few days (Molaei, 2015, p. 99; The Jakarta Globe, 2009c). In response to
the mounting pressure to resolve the case President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono eventually
established a fact-finding team known as Team Eight on 2 November 2009 (The Economist,
2009). This finally led to charges against the two deputy commissioners being dropped in
December 2009 (Lim, 2013, p. 6).
In practice, in addition to discussions and debates, shaming offenders is a common response
from social media users when they receive news and information about newly uncovered
corruption cases. Shame along with other negative emotions is often considered as part of the
perceived costs of committing corruption. Ausubel (1955, p. 382) defined shame as:
…an unpleasant emotional reaction by an individual to an actual or presumed negative judgment of
himself by others resulting in self-depreciation vis-à-vis the group.

Breggin (2015, p. 21) was of the opinion that shame is correlated with how others judge us as
well as how we judge our relationship to others. Bedford and Hwang (2003, p. 128) argued that
shame is “the feeling of loss of standing in the eyes of oneself or significant others and can occur
as the result of a failure to live up to expectations for a person of one's role or status." Evidence
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suggests that shame can be a powerful means to control people's behavior in the society.
However, it is worthy of note that although negative emotions such as shame and guilt are
universally recognized, and experienced culture plays a significant role in how they are
experienced by different individuals places (Furukawa et al., 2012, p. 90). For example, in his
study in Bengkulu (Indonesia) and California (United States) Fessler (2004) concluded that
shame is more intensely experienced by people in Bengkulu than those in California. This is so
as generally people from collectivistic cultures (e.g., Asian countries) tend to be more prone to
shame than those from individualistic cultures (e.g., American and European countries) (Fessler,
2004). Breugelman and Poortinga (2006), by comparing Rarámuri Indians (Mexico) with rural
Javanese (Indonesia), established that very often emotions such as guilt and shame are
communicated differently across cultures.
Evidence suggests that shame (malu) has been playing an important role in the Indonesian
governance system especially in the New Order regime during which it was misused as a means
to preserve the regime’s power (Collins and Bahar, 2000; Prabowo and Cooper, 2016). Prabowo
and Suhernita (Forthcoming) proposed that shame can be “re-invented” to fight corruption in
Indonesia by repositioning it as a social control mechanism. Silfver (2007, p. 169) believed that
guilt and shame play an important role in the development of moral behavior. As people are
generally trying to avoid experiencing them by behaving according to known personal or social
standard guilt and shame can become a means for social control by maintaining a sense of
personal identity (Creighton, 1990; Hultberg, 1988; Scheff, 1988). Social media such as Twitter,
when properly used, can be an effective instrument to induce shame in those who have
committed corruption and thus deterring others from choosing the same path in the future.
Together with other measures, the existence of shame can add to the existing perceived costs of
corruption.

Future Directions
Generally, just like in any other countries, the growth of ICTs in Indonesia comes with all kinds
of risk which must be managed in particular by the government. Although technology can be
threatening to have a comprehensive system that provides sufficient protection for both users and
information will enable it to benefit the society (Nugraha and Putri, 2016, p. 8). Furthermore, the
benefits of ICTs can spread across multiple areas including those of anti-corruption. For
example, Bertot et al. (2010) were of the opinion that among the benefits of ICTs is the
promotion of openness and transparency which will reduce corruption within public institutions.
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Although not the primary focus of this paper it is worthy of note that legal instruments are
essential to ensure that ICTs, in particular, the internet will not be misused for unlawful
purposes. However, such instruments should not be established at the expense of people’s
freedom of speech. In practice, this is easier said than done as there is always the big question of
who should govern the cyber world and how they should do it (Nugraha and Putri, 2016, p. 8).
Governing the cyber world is a new and challenging task for the Indonesian government.
A major step by the government in mitigating the threats from the development of ICTs was the
passing of the Law Number 11 of 2008 on Electronic Information and Electronic Transaction
(UU ITE) in April 2008. The law generally covers various aspects of ICTs in Indonesia including
those related to crime (Ministry of Communication and Information Technology of the Republic
of Indonesia, 2008, p. v). Among the important matters regulated by this law is the use of
electronic information and/or electronic documents as legitimate legal evidence as the expansion
of legitimate legal evidence pursuant to the Law of Procedure (article 5) (Ministry of
Communication and Information Technology of the Republic of Indonesia, 2008, p. 7).
Essentially, in addition to offences such as online pornography, fraud and money laundering the
law also covers online defamation, online blasphemy and online threats (SAFEnet, 2016).
Nevertheless, Nugraha and Putri (2016, p. 9) were of the opinion that the law has been perceived
as being ambiguous in preserving people’s freedom of expression within the corridors of ethics
and tolerance as evidenced by, among other things, the rising number of defamation cases
prosecuted under the law in the past few years. Finally, on 27 October 2016, the House of
Representatives (DPR) passed the draft revision of the Law No.11/2008 on Electronic
Information and Transactions (UU ITE) (The Jakarta Post, 2016). A month later the revision of
the Law finally came into effect on 28 November 2016 (Parlina, 2016). Despite the long process
of the revision, many still argue that the law still does not provide enough protection to people’s
freedom of speech. For example, as illustrated by Syahayani (2016):
Although ITE Law has been revised, it still invites criticisms, which are mainly concerned
with the article on insults and/or defamation; that is, Article 27 Paragraph (3) of ITE Law. In
general, both before and after the revision, Article 27 Paragraph (3) of UU ITE is still
considered by people could restrict or hamper the freedom of speech or expression. In other
words, the article is considered contrary to the essence of freedom of expression guaranteed
in Article 28 UUD 1945 (the Constitution of Indonesia).

Clearly, the Indonesian government still has much to do to find the right balance between
regulating the cyber world and preserving the freedom of speech for its citizens as measures that
were meant to reduce the negative effects of the internet ended up undermining internet freedom
even more (Freedom House, 2017).
Nevertheless, based on authors’ observation such drawbacks do not seem to discourage citizens
especially the young people from actively expressing their thoughts on social media including
criticizing the government. Warren et al. (2016) in their study revealed that young internet users
in Indonesia are promoting dialogue and debate on Facebook primarily through the publication
of information and sharing of links. Furthermore, Warren et al. (2016) also concluded that in
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comparison to Malaysia Indonesian youth are “more apprehensive about using Facebook for
lobbying, such as petitions."
Recently, the world has witnessed the growing power of social media as part of the egovernment initiatives to increase transparency and to reduce corrupt practices in the public
sector (Ali, 2011; Carlo Bertot et al., 2012). When effectively used social media may contribute
to the promotion of openness and accountability in the public sector and in turn reducing the risk
of corruption (Stamati et al., 2015). As noted by Meijer et al. (2012, p. 11) openness within a
government is concerning both the availability of information and interactions between
government and citizens. The development ICTs has to some extent influence the notion of open
government by emphasizing on providing citizens with opportunities to participate in the
procedures of government (Lathrop and Ruma, 2010, p. xix).
Social media such as blogs, wikis, social networks, microblogs, just to name a few, can be
optimized as means for citizens to receive information about government activities as well as to
express their opinions (Carlo Bertot et al., 2012). As demonstrated by Carlo Bertot et al. (2012,
p. 86) with regard to transparency and anti-corruption social media can be used to8:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Expose government processes, including bidding, contracting, and processing of forms;
Public monitoring of activities of government officials and their activities;
Speed processing of government forms;
Limit direct contact between members of the public and government officials;
Establish channels for information dissemination from government agencies to members
of the public, particularly through media that members of the public prefer using;
6. Provide outlets for public suggestions for improving government openness; and
7. Allow members of the public to track the progress of their own interactions with
government.

In Indonesia, socializing anti-corruption is a highly challenging task despite the efforts of various
institutions especially the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). Therefore, empowering
citizens to shift potential offenders’ cost – benefit perception may offer a long term solution for
anti-corruption movement. The high level of penetration of social media in Indonesia means that
more social interactions will be done in cyberspace and thus there will need to be a concerted
effort to optimize social media to attract citizens to discuss and share issues about corruption in
Indonesia.
In a discussion with the first author, a coordinator of the KPK’s Korsupgah (coordination,
supervision and prevention) initiative, Mr. Najib Wahito, it appears that in comparison with
those of investigation and prosecution events pertaining to corruption prevention do not seem to
attract much attention from social media users (Wahito, 2017). This is evidenced by the fact that
8

As discussed previously, the ITE Law has been considered by many international observers as curbing the freedom
of speech on the internet in Indonesia. Interestingly such limitation does not seem to affect citizens’ motivation to
actively engage in discussions and debates on various sensitive topics. This could be explained by the fact that the
country’s population is dominated by young people (Belot, 2013) who, according to a study by Warren et al. (2016),
are more apprehensive on social media and are willing to take the risk in voicing their thoughts. According to the
data from IndexMundi (2018) around 42% of Indonesia’s population is under the age of 25 making it a very youth
oriented country (Warren et al., 2016).
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only a few if not none of tweets and retweets are made on Twitter in relation to news on
corruption prevention activities (e.g., public lecturers, workshops, seminars, etc.) as opposed to
hundreds or sometimes even thousands from news on corrupt public officials’ arrests. As such,
there need to be further studies on how to optimize social media to support the existing anticorruption initiatives. Studies also need to be conducted on how to design more pro-active
approaches to educating citizens about anti-corruption through social media. Kietzmann et al.
(2011, 2012) postulated that social media consists of seven functional building blocks known as
the “honeycomb” of social media: identity, conversations, sharing, presence, relationships,
reputation, and groups. These building blocks depict the dimensions and dynamics of social
media including the interactions among users. Future studies need to explore the potential of
each building block in strengthening the anti-corruption regime in Indonesia by making
corruption an irrational choice of action for potential offenders.
With regard to future studies on anti-corruption a number of questions that warrant further
inquiries include:





How can we measure the success of social media movement in supporting anti-corruption
initiatives?
How can the anti-corruption agency take full advantage of the growing social media
usage in Indonesia to support the anti-corruption movement?
How can we attract more social media users to participate in anti-corruption movements?
What is the most suitable legal framework to regulate the use of social media is
supporting anti-corruption movements?

Concluding Remarks
This paper explores the potential of social media in supporting the anti-corruption movement in
Indonesia. Several important issues are highlighted in this paper with regard to the dynamics and
social interactions in social media platforms with a special reference to Twitter. By utilizing
Social Network Analysis (SNA) this paper highlights the various roles an internet user can
assume within a network in a social media platform in supporting the anti-corruption movement.
The analysis presented in this paper illustrate the potential power of citizen journalism through
social media in sending messages about corruption to the public. This paper demonstrates how
social media can contribute to anti-corruption movement in Indonesia in particular as a means for
communicating anti-corruption information to raise public awareness. Social media can also
function as a monitoring tool for diminishing the opportunity for public officials to misuse state
resources for their own benefits. Cases discussed in this paper have demonstrated how powerful
social media can be in uniting anti-corruption supporters to put pressure on the government to
support anti-corruption agenda. Together with other measures, social can media can contribute to
anti-corruption movement by creating a hostile environment for corrupt offenders by increasing
the risk of detection and prosecution and eventually making corruption an irrational choice of
action.
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Nevertheless, future studies are still needed to gain a more comprehensive understanding of how
to optimize the growing power of social media as a supporting measure for combating corruption
in Indonesia. Anti-corruption scholars need to develop their understanding of how each element
of social media can be optimized to support the anti-corruption movement based on which a
better anti-corruption strategy can be formulated.
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